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Introduction
The future Joint Force Commander (JFC) will have many challenges to face when organizing his forces and command structure. As the United States military begins to shape its force structure to conduct more operations on the lower end of the range of military operations (ROMO), particularly Counter-Insurgency (COIN), the JTF has many options when deciding how to conduct air operations in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.
The current model of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) running two separate theaters in Central Command (CENTCOM) is not using air power to its maximum potential for COIN operations. The COAC does not adequately integrate with the ground scheme of maneuver, does not have the command organization necessary for COIN operations, and does not use the battlespace effectively. These negative factors combine into a system that is slow to respond and does not meet the needs of the ground commander. The JFC needs to shape his aviation arm to be flexible, quick to respond, and above all the supporting arm for the ground scheme of maneuver. To overcome the current shortfalls the JFC can build a joint operational construct that ensures success by accounting for forces available, maximizing the use of space to create more flexibility, which will lead to an aviation force that is supportive of the ground scheme of maneuver during COIN operations.
Back to Our Roots
Alfred Cunningham, the Marine Corps' first aviator, stated, "The only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions." 1 This is more true than ever in COIN. Air operations should be used in concert with the ground scheme of maneuver. However, large scale operations are usually thought of in sequential terms; air power being used to set conditions on a battlefield and then ground operations will follow. The massive formations of bombers used during World War II in Germany and Japan, or the more recent heavy bombing missions during the opening phases of OIF, bring to mind the traditional way aviation is be used to degrade an enemy force before ground troops ever come in contact with it. Most of modern-day aviation training is dedicated to large-scale conflicts against a peer enemy.
After the fall of Saddam's regime the military's' doctrine was not prepared for lower intensity conflicts 2 . However, using aviation in COIN is not a post-9/11 phenomenon. The
Marine Corps laid out many founding principles for fighting "small wars" in 1940 as a result of its experiences fighting insurgencies in the Caribbean during the 1920s and 1930s.
Although certain types of equipment described are obsolete, the Small Wars Manual identifies many principles which are relevant for a JFC. The overarching theme is that the aviation arm during COIN operations works directly for the ground commander. The Small Wars Manual lists many mission sub-sets for the aviation arm; reconnaissance, strikes, and patrol support are a few listed. Each mission comes with a detailed description of it can best be tied to the ground units objectives. 3 As a recent Tiger Team report from the USAF and the Marine Corps stated, "To be effective in irregular warfare or counter-insurgency, airpower should be tightly integrated and synchronized with ground operations." 4 The current CAOC structure in CENTCOM does not work towards effective COIN operations. The AFMCTT stated that, "The USAF's TACS (theater air control system) structure optimized for MCO (major combat operations) is significantly challenged to fully integrate and synchronize airpower with ground forces in IW (irregular warfare lessons learned stated, "The air cell's air-to-ground integration improved and, consequently, the air-to-ground integration became the most effective combat tactic for company (-)
operations." 18 This lessons learned highlights that although prior to deployment close integrated training was not possible, the tactical operations became more effective over time due to a close working relationship.
This same model can be adopted by the JFC for his air operations in COIN operations, particularly when establishing his command organization. The USMC Small
Wars Manual states that the air commander for COIN must "maintain frequent contact with the Force Commander and his staff." 19 Although the Small Wars Manual never envisioned SIPR (secret internet protocol) and VTC's (video teleconferences), the rule remains the same.
More importantly is the type of contact. When an air staff and ground staff work side by side a greater unity of effort is achieved. The German Luftwaffe moved its headquarters next to General Manstein's during the Crimean campaign when the Germans were about to begin the offensive to remove recently arrived Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula. 20 By working side by side by side, and not via distances, the staffs were able to achieve a unity of effort not yet seen during that campaign. The operational design preparations the JFC makes in the factors force and space will create the benefits against the factor of time. Milan Vego, in his magnum opus Joint Operational Warfare, states, "Mastering the factor of time in combat essentially means acting faster than the opponent. Then the key to success is to shorten the time for estimating the situation, making a decision, and deploying and maneuvering one's combat forces." 27 A JFC when assigned an AO for a COIN is working against the clock, even more so than in a conventional operation. If a COIN operations' success truly depends upon winning the population, as Galula stated, then the enemy has an advantage. 28 The enemy is working on familiar ground with a history already established with the local populace. The conduct of the enemy may be negative towards the populace, but it may have a substantial foothold. The JFC will have to conduct his operations reactively to the situation already established by the enemy insurgency.
When an insurgent force strikes, it is usually at a place, time, and with the force of his choosing. When responding to a TIC the JFC is working at a time disadvantage. The effectiveness of a COIN counter-strike is wholly dependent upon how fast forces can be mustered. In some circumstances the COIN forces on the ground are enough to deal with the threat, but with the inherent confusion of an ambush, and the difficulty of operating in an urban environment, it is aviation which can turn the tide. In OIF and OEF the enemy utilizes the advantage of urban terrain and knowledge of the area to use hit and run tactics. The attacks do not normally last longer than seven to ten minutes. would do it. Why? Because the time you need to spin up the CFACC crew will take that long at a minimum." 30 Many situations in a COIN will not entail kinetic fires, but will still require the need for quick action. The emphasis for most situations will be on the second portion of Vego's definition entailing the assessment of a situation, making a decision, and then employing ones combat forces. ISR will be a major task for any aviation asset. 31 Some of this ISR will be pre-planned, while often it will be put into position after actionable intelligence is The JFC is concerned with such a tactical strike, but is more concerned with building and acting upon his operational intelligence. For example, there may be a large group of individuals gathering in a remote location. This situation could be establishing the beginning of a pattern of enemy dispersment of weapons. 32 The JFC can both observe and follow each individual, but assets available would probably make this an unlikely option. The JFC may wish to intercept the group, or set up roadblocks to quickly cordon off a section of his AO.
An aviation option could be the aeroscout mission as used successfully by the Marines in Al
Anbar. 33 This type of mission is tactical in nature, but is controlled at an operational level for running." 35 The JFC may not have 3 days to wait for a command and control structure to be up and running. He may also not have the capacity to support large land based radars.
Procedural control is a more effective means of managing the JFC's air space quickly and effectively.
Procedural control is designed to push aircraft down to the user quickly. Positive control has a series of command approval layers built into it. In OIF the CAOC routinely used up aircrafts' on station time, while waiting for guidance on tasking. 36 In the MEF AOR during the opening phases of OIF and during Fallujah, using procedural control, the DASC, quickly pushed aircraft down to whoever needed it.
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Counter Argument: The Wheel Is Already Round A counter-argument to having a unique set-up for air operations in COIN is that air power would be parceled out into smaller and smaller numbers. Massing firepower and having a very centralized control structure is the best way to maximize the full effects of air power in MCO. However, COIN operations do not need large formations or planning that occurs removed from the JFCs AO. Air operations in a COIN require a small force capable of being deployed rapidly. They require a detailed level of integration for them to be the most successful. Furthermore, having air assets rigidly controlled by an air commander is counter to who is being supported; the ground commander. In no place in the U.S. Air Force's recently published doctrine on irregular warfare does it ever elude to the fact that air power is a supporting arm. 38 Proponents of keeping the same system in place point to Fallujah in 2004, where the COAC and MEF worked their differences out seamlessly. The reality is that there were two separate systems working independently of one another. The MEF used detailed planning, close integration, and procedural control to conduct a ten battalion sweep of the city with zero air to ground fratricides. 39 Two separate systems, designed for different uses is not the most effective way to utilize scarce aviation assets. A single flexible system, designed to support the ground scheme, much like the MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force) employs, should be the basis for the future JFC.
Conclusion: Operational Considerations Bringing Tactical Success
The changes mentioned in this paper are not new ideas. They stem from lessons learned by the Marine Corps eighty years ago. The JFC, when establishing his aviation forces will have many options in terms of force, space, and time. To utilize his air power most effectively he will need to have a mix of forces with forward deploying capability. The ground scheme of maneuver in COIN operations is the supported element. All other combat and service support elements are supporting. By creating a command organization and having staffs co-located the JFC can ensure a greater unity of command and effort .The JFC will need to tie his aviation units as closely to the ground forces through a combination of FOBs, airspace measures, and training. Although his aviation assets may be used only in tactical scenarios, by establishing the right operational design, the JFC can assure that his air power can support the ground combat element and be brought to bear each and every time it is called upon.
Recommendations
There are changes which could be implemented by the current COIN operations in OIF and OEF. At a minimum the CAOC needs to be brought back under the organizational control of the JFC in OEF, especially as operations in Iraq wind down and the August 2011 withdraw date draws closer. The AFMCTT highlighted that air assets need to be pushed down to the lowest level, but moving the CFACC under the respective JFCs would be the first step. 40 The next step would be reversing the trend of LNOs assigned to the CAOC. The majority of liaison needs to occur with the CAOC asking what support is required in a proactive manner by being imbedded with the ground units they support, not a handful of ground LNO's asking for assets. Finally, the current JFCs can establish more FOBs to push aviation out to where it is needed the most; in the field with the ground combat element. The USMC is looking to aggressively place FOBs throughout their soon to be assigned AO in Afghanistan, but it will only be one small portion of the overall effort. 41 The issues and solutions presented in this paper are intended for future COIN operations, where a JFC is unencumbered by a system already in place. The greatest step in 
